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‘What (Else) was Behind the Newtonian Rejection of ‘Hypotheses’? 
Catherine Wilson 
To appear in a volume on Experiment, Speculation, and Religion in Early Modern 




[I]t is proper to acquaint you that his great application 
in his inquirys into Nature did not make him 
unmindfull of the great Author of Nature; they were 
little acquainted with him, who imagine that he was so 
intent upon his studys of Geometry & Philosophy as 
to neglect that of Religion & other things subservient 
to it. And this I know that he was much more 
fellicitous in his inquirys into Religion than into 
Natural Philosophy; & that the reason of his showing 
the errors of Cartes’s Philosophy, was because he 
thought it was made on purpose to be the foundation 
of infidelity. (Letter from John Craig to unidentified 
recipient, dated 7 April 1727 Keynes Ms. 132, King’s 
College, Cambridge, UK.  
 
 
‘Vain wisdom all and false Philosophy’ (John Milton, 
Paradise Lost II.565). 
 
 
    In Query 27 of the second English edition of his Opticks, appearing in 1717, Isaac 
Newton stated that ‘the main Business of natural Philosophy is to argue from 
Phaenomena without feigning Hypotheses, and to deduce Causes from Effects.’
1
 
More than forty years earlier, Newton had professed himself reluctant to advance ‘any 
Hypothesis of light & colours’ fearing that ‘it might be a means to ingage [him] in 
vain disputes,’
2
 and the Principia mathematica philosophiae naturalis of 1687 was 
proposed as a mathematical demonstration of an attractive force between masses that, 
in combination with straight line inertial motion, explained the planetary and lunar 
orbits.  By contrast, Descartes’s solution in his Principia philosophiae of 1644 to the 
problem of orbital motion was to say that, although motion was normally rectilinear, 
God had formed numerous vortices of fluid matter in space that carried the solid 
planets around in them like planks caught in a whirlpool.
3
  Descartes’s solution was 
2 
 
neither a demonstration, nor a mathematical construction, but an explanation based on 
the closest terrestrial analogy that Descartes was able to think of.   
    The Newtonian repudiation of hypotheses suggests the existence of a wide 
methodological and epistemological gulf between Cartesian and Newtonian science, 
and evidence for such a gulf is not lacking. Roger Cotes, in the Preface to the second 
edition of the Principia (1713), inveighed against the Cartesians who, he complained, 
‘take the liberty of imagining that the unknown shapes and sizes of the particles are 
whatever they please, and of assuming their uncertain positions and motions.’
4
 Peter 
Anstey has argued that Newton’s declaration should be seen in light of a distinction 
between speculative and experimental natural philosophy of wide generality and deep 
consequence that was employed in some form or other in texts produced from the 
1650s to the early 1700s. The distinction, he says, provided the ‘primary 
methodological framework within which natural philosophy was developed and 
practiced in the seventeenth century.’ It ‘crystallised in the 1690s when opposition to 
hypotheses in natural philosophy methodology intensified.’ It furnished the terms of 
reference, he says, for interpreting Newton’s famous ‘hypotheses non fingo’.
5
 
Anstey was careful to point out that the experimental-speculative distinction 
did not sort individual natural philosophers of the late 17
th
 century into two camps, 
one composed of those who performed experiments and eschewed speculation and the 
other of those who speculated and condemned experiment as useless and uncertain. 
But he went on to suggest that  
 
These terms [experimental and speculative] ‘save the phenomena’ of our historical 
data in a manner that is far more satisfactory than the ‘fancies’ of nineteenth and 
twentieth century historiographers. Indeed it may be that the very origins of the 
categories rationalism and empiricism are to be found in the philosophical 




And this suggestion reappears in the more recent article of Anstey and Alberto 
Vanzo.
7
 They point to Diderot’s distinction between philosophie experimentelle and 
philosophie rationelle, and his predilection for the former, and to some late 18
th
 






The concepts of experimental and speculative are unquestionably actor’s categories 
and central to our understanding of the period. The original exposition in Anstey’s 
paper raised a number of questions for further exploration that I would like to address 
in this paper. As Desmond Clarke observed, ‘[T]he phenomenal success of the 
Principia…provided a misleading model for the natural sciences, according to which 
the certainty of mathematical inferences and the certainty of sensory observations 
compensated for the uncertainty that is necessarily involved in the confirmation of 
hypothetical explanations of natural phenomena.’
9
 Newton himself, he comments, 
expended ‘almost obsessive efforts to avoid admitting that his natural philosophy 
necessarily used hypotheses.’ In light of the following points, one might wonder why 
Newton and his followers adopted this stance and whether they were justified in doing 
so: 
    First, the best-known ‘experimental’ philosophers—Bacon, Boyle, and Hooke—
present speculative philosophy as complementary to and furthered by experiments. 
Boyle propounded criteria for good hypotheses, entitled a treatise The Excellency and 
Grounds of the Mechanical Hypothesis, and advanced many mechanical hypotheses 
of his own.
10
 What distinguished acceptable hypotheses that had a place in 
experimental philosophy from unacceptable hypotheses that did not, when all were 
alike indemonstrable?  
Second, ‘speculative’ philosophy is sometimes identified with scholastic natural 
philosophy and criticised as empty verbiage, but at other times it is identified with 
Cartesianism. Descartes was a sharp critic of scholastic natural philosophy as failing 
to give satisfactory causal accounts of physical phenomena; his micromechanical 
models inspired the Royal Society experimentalists. Why would he be considered 
another speculator?  
 Third, despite his reservations, Newton decided to present his ‘hypothesis’ of light 
and colour in 1674.  Moreover, his published writings on natural philosophy, 
including the Principia and the Opticks, as well as his unpublished alchemical and 
chronological enquiries, not only abound in references to invisible micromechanisms, 
but indicate the possession of a free-ranging cosmological imagination that expressed 
itself in an enthusiastic manner and for which no controlled experimental evidence 
whatsoever was available. By what right could Newton and his followers claim to 
eschew hypotheses?  
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 To answer these questions, we need to consider an important factor relevant to 
the expressed mistrust of hypotheses, namely the role of physico-theology.  On the 
account I propose here, the Royal Society in the second half of the 17
th
 century was 
not averse to many forms of speculation, and certainly not to the presentation of 
micromechanical hypotheses like Boyle’s springy air particles or John Mayow’s nitro-
aerial corpuscles, or Newton’s supposition that the size and density of the particles of 
a substance is related to its colour
11
 to ‘explicate’ experimental observations even 
when there was no possibility of demonstrating them. Further, the Newtonians 
welcomed experience-transcendent cosmological speculation as legitimating their 
basic adherence to the mechanical philosophy. The grounds for their suspicion about a 
certain class of hypotheses were theological, not epistemological in origin. The ‘new’ 
mechanico-corpsucular philosophy was an updated version of the old atheistic 
atomism of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. The Cartesian account of the world 
given in his Principles of Philosophy was understood all over Europe as a threatening 
work reviving this old tradition.  Although he stipulated that God was the author of 
nature, the preserver of the human soul, and the guarantor of all correct reasoning, 
Descartes presented nature as a self-contained mechanical system and the cosmos and 
the animal as a self-forming and self-maintaining entity. 
12
     
The Newtonians had to extricate their master—and Newton had to extricate 
himself—from the accusation that he was going further down the road of elaborating 
a theory of self-sufficient nature in which—even more alarmingly than in Descartes’ 
cosmology and physics —activity was intrinsic to matter. To ensure that Newtonian 
natural philosophy was sharply differentiated from putative Cartesian corpuscularian 
atheism, Newton and his followers attacked the Cartesian accounts of the emergence 
of the world and its inhabitants as merely hypothetical and promulgated a rival 
cosmology, the character of which was—necessarily—rather speculative, at least in 
our own sense. This was accomplished by reintroducing a divine presence and agency 
into physics to show that ‘figures and motions’ were radically insufficient to explain 
the origins of the cosmos, or its maintenance, or life, sensation, and thought. 
Attraction was treated as a manifestation of God’s mysterious but undeniable 
ubiquity, inexplicable in mechanical terms.  
To be sure, the need for conjecture was frustrating for the first generation of 
17
th
 century neo-corpuscularians who had hoped to see with their microscopes the 
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corpuscular substructure of the world, or to infer by it Baconian methods. Yet, it was 
seemingly—and in reality—the way forward.  There were profound and lingering 
effects of the Newtonian pronouncements, but they did not crystallise opposition in 
the sense either of staunching the promulgation of hypotheses or discouraging 
speculation (as distinct from furnishing a misleading model of scientific 
methodology) across the board. For the 17th and 18th centuries, then, there is little 
sign of a sharp cleavage between a stream of proper scientific method involving 
experiment and mathematical demonstration and a stream of hypothetical reasoning.  
Rather, there is ongoing anxiety over the truth status of the Christian revelation 
leading to a condemnation of deistic hypotheses awarding self-organising powers to 
matter. Nevertheless, the empiricism-rationalism distinction, which is not an actor’s 
category, but one constructed by later historians, does capture, as I will explain later, 
two divergent ways of dealing with the threat of the elimination of Providence in a 
theory of self-sufficient nature, two ways often pursued by one and the same natural 
philosopher. 
 
1.  Experimental and Speculative Philosophy 
 Anstey describes experimental natural philosophy as ‘the collection and 
ordering of observations and experimental reports with a view to the development of 
explanations of natural phenomena based on these observations and experiments’ and 
speculative natural philosophy as ‘the development of explanations of natural 
phenomena without prior recourse to systematic observation and experiment. ‘
13
 The 
term ‘experimental philosophy’ is ascribed to Samuel Hartlib who employed it in 
1635, but the notion is implicit in Bacon, as he observes. In his influential De 




The experimental-speculative distinction as applied to natural philosophy is 
evidently derived from the earlier distinction between practical and speculative forms 
of knowledge-seeking or just thinking. Experimental natural philosophy came to be 
understood as involving multi-sensory experience of sights, smells, colours, tastes, 
and hands-on practice employing machines, optical and measuring instruments, 
surgical tools, and specially fabricated devices such as mirrors, flasks, tubes, and 
furnaces.  The distinction remains neutral, however, as Anstey himself points out, in 
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many contexts throughout the 17
th
 century, with practice and speculation presented as 
good friends to one another.  Bacon himself maintained that ‘true and fruitful natural 
philosophy’ required both, ‘first ascending to axioms, then descending to works.’
15
 
His distaste for the verbal philosophy of the schoolmen and the fantasies of the 
chemical philosophers thus lies in a different critical plane from his operative-
speculative distinction. There are purely classificatory references in the literature of 
the period to speculative geometry and practical, speculative physiology and practical, 
to speculative and practical atheism,
16
 and even speculative and practical self-
pollution.
17
 Archimedes, for example, was praised for ‘his divine knowledge, both in 
the Speculative and Practical part’ –the former comprising his mathematical methods 
and demonstrations, the latter his inventions, such as ‘Engines for peace and war.’
18
  
Burgess, in his treatise of original sin (1654) declared that despite man’s polluted 
state, he retains ‘some imbred principles both speculative and practical, which can no 
more be separated from the soul, then the beams from the Sunne.’
19
 And Locke 
contradicted this claim in 1689, arguing against this view noting however that ‘There 
is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain Principles 




The official ontology of the Royal Society experimentalists, the ‘corpusculo-
mechanical philosophy,’ implied the conjunction and complementarity of speculative 
and experimental. Boyle and Hooke both conceived hypotheses as necessary and 
complementary to experiment and observation for providing the understanding and 
control that they were seeking.  Hooke’s Micrographia (1665) interwove his detailed 
observations of insects, plant parts, and artefacts, with his conjectures about how 
effects are produced by subvisible causes. Elsewhere, Hooke speculated about 
memory, employing the analogy of phosphorus, which absorbs and remits light;
21
 
about the extinction of ancient animals;
22
 about the causes of combustion,
23
  and about 
many other phenomena not amenable to controlled experimentation.  He referred to 
what he termed the ‘speculative and rationall part’ of any artisanal practice.  
Defending his literary practice, and anxious to be considered, despite his subaltern 
status as a demonstrator for the Royal Society, as the gifted mathematician and 
physicist he was, he asserted that it would be ‘more advanced by teaching ‘perpetuall 
and universal knowledge’ than by teaching mechanical knowledge; that when 
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lecturing on trades, practices and industrial production, one ought to discuss reasons 
and causes, and begin with ‘first principles;’ and that his own pursuit of ‘unheard of 
discoveries and inventions,’ ought not to be interfered with and that he should be 
allowed to follow his ‘fancy.’
24
  
Boyle alternated between experimental reports and conjectures regarding 
invisible mechanisms, offering, in his treatise on Colours (1663) ‘divers new 
speculative Considerations and hints, which perhaps may afford no despicable 
Assistance towards the framing of a solid and comprehensive Hypothesis,’
25
  He 
testified to the usefulness of his investigations for painters and dyers, but he kept his 
eye on the other side of the  speculative-experimental divide as well.
26
  ‘Since we are 
treating of Emphatical Colours,’ he declared, ‘we shall add what we think not 
unworthy of your Observation, and not unfit to afford some Exercise to the 
Speculative.’
27
 He stressed, as did Bacon, that he could supply only a few 
suggestions, leaving most of the work for future inquirers armed with more and better 
systematized data.
 28
  In his Free Enquiry (1686), Boyle remained persuaded that the 
‘framing a right or a wrong Idea of Nature must be in Reference both to the 
Speculative and Practical Part of Physiology.’
29
  
    At the same time, disparaging references to ‘empty Conjecturalists; 
30
  the 
philosophy of Notion and Dispute, which still runs round in the Labyrinth of Talk, but 
advanceth nothing’ 
31
 and ‘the meer Speculative Philosopher;’ 
32
 abound in the 
programmatic writings of those early Royal Society figures who were less involved 
with day-to-day experimental practice than were Boyle and Hooke. And, from the 
early 17
th
 century, a valorisation of praise for immediate experience and engagement 
with ‘things’ circulates between theology, pedagogy, and natural philosophy.  Books, 
words, arguments, logic, and disputations are all downgraded.
33
   
      
 2.  ‘Vaine Philosophy’ and Cartesian Fantasy  
A long literary history important for understanding this issue opposes 
Christian doctrine to ‘vaine philosophy.’  Philosophy was declared by theological 
writers to be marred by sectarian contradiction and conflict, infected by pagan 
naturalism, and uncertain by contrast with the unique truth of Revelation.  Indeed, as a 
machine-based survey of book titles and contents will quickly confirm, the term 
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‘truth’ was principally used in theological contexts and was not associated in the 17
th
 
century, except, notably, by Descartes and the Cartesians,
34
 with knowledge of nature. 
Early modern texts are replete with references to refer to the ‘emptieness of vain 
philosophy;’ 
35
 to ‘soules polluted with this vayne Philosophie,’
36
 to the ‘poysoned 
distinctions,’ of ‘vaine philosophie,’
37
 to the subtleties and sophistries of vaine 
philosophy;
38
 to those seduced and spoiled or blinded or bewitched by vaine 
philosophy. 
39
 As it is difficult to see scholastic discourse as beguiling, poisonous, and 
polluting, rather than as boring or of no practical use, these epithets need to be 
understood as directed to pagan nature philosophy specifically.  Incessantly, the 
critics of philosophy echo or slightly misquote Paul’s warning in Chapter 2 of his 
Letter to the Colossians,  
Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the 
tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ. 
Who were the deceitful philosophers of Paul’s era?  They may have been 
magicians and astrologers, fixated on the stars and fate,
40
 or, as Calvin supposed, the 
Platonic speculators, like pseudo-Dionysius, who discoursed of angels and celestial 
hierarchies.
41
  But Paul was also familiar with the writings of Stoics and Epicureans, 
with whom he carried on a confrontational relationship.  In any case, Christian 
theology had little love for the ontological and eschatological doctrine of the main 
schools of ancient philosophy, and even Aristotle was recruited to the cause with 
much residual difficulty.
42
  Philosophy can be vain because it is empty and notional, 
but this is not what Paul has in mind. It can also be vain because it overrates the 
powers of nature and is engaged with and curious about material things, natural 
causes, and the ‘rudiments of the world’ to the neglect of Providence, divine agency, 
and spiritual things.  
As Anstey notes, Boyle lists Leucippus and Epicurus, along with Aristotle, 
and the so called Italian naturalists, Telesio and Campanella as ‘speculative 
Devisers of new hypotheses.’ 
43
 The association between materialistic pagan 
ontologies, conflict and uncertainty, and ‘hypotheses’ was ubiquitous in theological 
writing of the mid-17
th
 century. Samuel Annesley conceded that God has left ‘some 
Idea’s or Footsteps of himself on the things that are made,’ so that the hypotheses of 
Aristotle, Epicurus, Gassendi, and Descartes all solved some phenomena, but, he 





 Boyle, in one of his doubting moods, tried to persuade the 
reader (and himself) not to ‘flie from the Difficulties that attend the granting of a 
Deity and Providence to Hypotheses, whether Epicurean or other, that are 
themselves incumber’d with confounding Difficulties.’
45
  He declared that with 
regard to ‘the Hypotheses and Opinions of the several Sects of Philosophers, 
especially in those points wherein they hold things repugnant to Theological truths, 
we shall find many of them so slightly grounded, and so disagreeing among 




Robert Dixon stated in his book (1676) on The nature of the two testaments 
that ‘here will be no tottering Hypotheses, nor crooked Conclusions…’ And 
Theophilus Gale (1677) attacked ‘that conceited, windy, empty, speculative 
Knowledge of Philosophie [that] does but puffe up the mind and fil it with Pride, 
Vanitie and Ostentation, which is but conceited ignorance…. an Epidemic Disease 
and Universal Contagion, which tainted al Pagan Philosophie and Philosophers.’
47
 
He quoted the 3
rd
 century Christian apologist Marcus Minutius Felix as saying that 
although ‘proud and vain Philosophie’ received its first rudiments of theological 
knowledge from ‘the sacred Oreacles,’ yet it hath ever rejected, yea opposed the 
same, endeavouring by its vain and curiose searches into sacred Mysteries, to 
comprehend and reduce the same to the measures of its proud conceivings.’
48
 
Francis Gastrell (1697) said that the ‘General Proof of Religion,’ can ‘stand good, 
no particular difficulties either in the real Phenomena of Nature, or in the arbitrary 
Schemes and Hypotheses of Men,’ especially those concerning the ‘Origin, 
Duration, and present state of the World.’ 
49
  In 1700, Robert Jenkin in The 
Reasonableness and Certainty of the Christian Religion, accused men who had too 
much Philosophy and no Religion of seeking ‘New and Surprising’ Hypotheses, and 
‘New Systems of the World’ especially a ‘New Account of the Origin of the 
Universe’ which will become ‘as common as New Romances.’
50
 
Bishop Stillingfleet’s massive Origines Sacrae, the first of whose five editions 
appeared in 1662, confirms the suspicion that the most mistrusted speculative 
philosophy of the second half of the 17
th
 century corresponded to the vainest of all the 
vain philosophies of the ancients.  Stillingfleet contrasted their ‘jejune unproved 
hypotheses in Philosophy,’ which threatened the doctrines of ‘Creation, Providence, 
10 
 
if not immortality of souls, and the Being of God himself,’ with the ‘sublimer 
mysteries of the Trinity, Divinity of Christ, Resurrection.’
51
 At issue for Stillingfleet 
as well was the Mosaic history of the world versus that of the ‘Philosophers in their 
speculations.’ 
It was certainly the great defect of the natural philosophy of the Greeks, (as it hath 
been ever since in the world) that they were so ready to form Theoryes upon some 
principles or hypotheses which they only received by Tradition from others, without 
fetching their knowledge from the experiments of nature; and to these they suited all 
the phenomena of nature; and what was not suitable was rejected as monstrous and 
Anomalous: Truth and Antiquity wrestle so much with the corruptions which eat 
into them through the pride and ignorance of the Greeks.
52
 
The chief criminals in this regard were ‘the ‘Aristotelian and Epicurean Atheists.’ We 
find, Stillingfleet said,   
 
the reasons on which they reject a Deity so lamentably weak, and so easily retorted 
upon themselves, and the hypotheses they substitute instead of a Deity so 
precarious, obscure and uncertain, that we need no other argument to evince the 





Where the origins of the world and its atomic composition were concerned, 
Stillingfleet insisted that ‘this Hypothesis of Epicurus was very precarious, and is 
built on no foundation of reason.’ 
54
 Worse, the willingness of corpuscularians to 
accept precarious, obscure, hypothetical reasoning—presumably forsaking sense-
experience, revelation, and authority—has led them to assign religion to the category 
of the unproved and hypothetical:   
 
I may confidently say the great gullery of the world hath been, taking philosophical 
dictates for the standard of reason, and unproved hypotheses for certain foundations 
for our discourse to rely upon. And the seeking to reconcile the mysteries of our 
faith to these, hath been that which hath almost destroyed it, and turned our Religion 






Joseph Glanvill for one protested against the attempted interference of the clergy with 
experimental philosophy.
56
 But to fend off such attacks on the new philosophy under 
its experimental and speculative headings, it became increasingly important to 
respond to accusations of impiety and to dissociate it from the ancient pagan 
materialism and atheism from which it had in fact taken a good deal of inspiration.   
 It is in this light that Sir Robert Moray’s ban on speculation in the Royal 
Society regarding ‘Originall causes’ is to be understood. ‘This Society,’ he asserted, 
‘will not own any Hypothesis, systeme, or doctrine of the principles of Naturall 
philosophy, proposed or maintained by any Philosopher Ancient or Moderne, nor the 
explication of any phenomenon, where recourse must be had to Originall causes,…’
57
 
The question of the origins of the world and of its plants and animals were here as 
well the central focus of concern, and Descartes’s hypotheses furnished the 
provocation.   
 
3. The Trouble with Cartesianism 
Descartes was not, as noted, a purveyor of ‘notions’ or empty verbiage. The 
Baconian criticisms did not apply to him in this regard. But the sincerity of his 
arguments for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul were widely 
questioned.  He was seen as prideful, as a modern exemplar of vain philosophy, and 
as engaged in forbidden speculations regarding the origins of the world and of 
animals. His own protective references to his account of the world as a ‘fable’ or, 
alternatively, as only the most likely reading of the code of nature, or even as just 
false furnished ammunition to his critics.  
 In Le Monde, first published in Paris in 1664,
58
 but written much earlier, 
Descartes invited the reader to allow his thoughts to ‘wander beyond this world to 
view another world –a wholly new one which I shall bring into being before your 
mind in imaginary spaces’ 
59
 and the fictional device was employed again in the 
Principia philosophiae, published in Amsterdam in 1644 and in London in 1664.
60
  
There, Descartes stated that ‘there is no doubt that the world was created right from 
the start with all the perfection that it now has,’ with sun, moon, stars, and Adam and 
Eve as fully grown adults.’ However, if we want to ‘understand the nature of plants or 




Thus we may be able to think up certain very simple and easily known principles 
which can serve, as it were, as the seeds from which we can demonstrate that the 





‘The falsity of these suppositions,’ he added, referring to his assumptions regarding 
matter and motion and the first instants of creation, ‘does not prevent the 
consequences deduced from them from being true and certain.’
62
 There followed the 
exposition of his applied physics which was supposed to account for everything from 
celestial motion to magnetism, to fire, snow, and the formation of salt. The formation 
of the foetus from particles in motion was a subject reserved for another book.   
On Descartes’s ‘philosophical’ principles, God lays down the eternal truths –
logic, mathematics, the laws of motion—and creates matter, which, once its parts are 
set in motion, is at first distributed into parcels chaotically (or, as the later version of 
the Principles has it, uniformly, and so in a more orderly manner befitting God).
63
 
That is all God ever does.  Everything else –the formation of the cosmos and the 
world, the appearance of plants and animals, generation and growth, everything that 
happens in a person’s mind except their volition, rational cognition, and invention 
unfolds without assistance or intervention from then on.
64
 Descartes’s ‘original 
principles’ are the doctrine that there is nothing in external objects except shapes, 
sizes, and motions and that sensations are produced by the motions they set up in our 
nerves which give rise to or are correlated with ideas in our minds.
 
 He disclaimed any 
particular connection with Democritus (though he professed to admire Epicurean 
morality in his private letters), insisting that his ontological framework was non-
sectarian and in fact the ‘oldest and most common of all.’
65
 Nevertheless, the well-
founded suspicion that Descartes was a neo-pagan, a self-confessed representative of 
deceitful philosophy, was widespread both on the Continent and in England, as is 
evident from the outcries of his many late 17th century critics.
66
  
Clearly Descartes was overreaching himself, and his rhetoric contrasts with 
the cautious, apologetic formulae of Boyle operating within the same corpusculo-
mechanical framework.
67
  He claimed in the Principles of Philosophy that ‘there is no 
phenomenon of nature which has been overlooked in this treatise’
68
 and that ‘if people 
look at all the many properties relating to magnetism, fire and the fabric of the entire 
world, which I have deduced in this book from just a few principles’ they will at least 
13 
 
be impressed by his explanatory achievement.
69
 Once his framework is accepted, he 
declares, ‘all the other phenomena, or at least the general features of the universe and 
the earth... can hardly be intelligibly explained except in the way I have suggested.’
70
 
But it is what Descartes did not say in his various treatises that was as telling—
sometimes more telling—than what he did say. Although his Meditations were 
carefully contrived to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, 
Descartes’s proofs for the existence of God did not mention visible nature.  He 
discussed rather his own origins and the origin of his idea of God, and then he 
rehashed the ontological argument of Aquinas.  His argument for the immortality of 
the soul was similarly divorced from the observation of nature. It is perfectly abstract 
(the ‘real distinction argument’).  Descartes failed to say what natural philosophers 
were supposed to say to establish their bona fides, that visible nature testified to the 
existence of a caring God and that providential planning; that the existence of the 
immortal human soul was revealed by Scripture and did not need to be proved by 
abstruse and roundabout logical arguments. In making God to be the condition of all 
exchanges of motion in the universe, Descartes prevented God from doing anything 
outside the ordinary course of nature.   
If we look upon Descartes’ suppositions, said Sir Matthew Hale in The 
Primitive Origination of Mankind (1677),  
 
what colour of evidence have we of the various Configurations of his Atomes, the 
grinding of them round by their mutual attritions, the coalition of the Globular 
Atomes into the Heavenly Bodies, the filling of Chinks and Interstices by the 
Ramenta of the greater, whereby a Materia Subtilis is diffused through the Universe, 
which is invisible, performs most of those motions that we see in things, that the 
Animals are only Engins, and actuated by the mobility of this subtil matter? These, 
and infinite more artificial Inventions of his there are, that neither Sense nor Reason 
could ever acquaint him or us with; but they are an ingenious Creature of his own 
fruitful Invention, wittily framed to explicate not so much the Nature of things, but 
those Conceptions he entertained thereof, and to reduce and range them into an 






Hale went on to evoke the Baconian distinction between solutions of the phenomena 
derived directly from reality and the products of the human imagination, including 
systems of the world and explanations of particular phenomena 
 
And hence it is, that if we consider the various Hypotheses of the ancient and 
modern Philosophers, touching the general Systeme of the World, and those more 
Universal and Cardinal Solutions of the common and great Appearances in Nature, 
we shall find them or the greatest part of them, to be little else than excogitated and 
invented Models, not so much arising from the true Image of the things themselves, 
or resulting from the real Existence of them, as certain instituted and artificial 
Contrivances of mens Wits and Fancies. And these Suppositions being thus 
invented, they distort, stretch and reduce the Orders of things in a conformation to 




And John Cockburn in his Enquiry into the nature, necessity and evidence of 
Christian faith (1699) piled on the criticism, declaring that in laying down 
hypotheses, Descartes had ‘turned his Back upon the only true Light that was to have 
guided him; he has groped in the Dark and produced nothing but useless Conjectures 
and the extravagant Ravings of the Brain, which tickled Men at first, as all Novelties 
use to do, but which wise, inquisitive, and thinking Men-will, and must disgust, 




Accordingly, the careful probabilistic language of the Royal Society,
74
 implied not 
only a newly sophisticated, fallibilist approach to methodology, but a concern not to 
invade the realm of the Truth with vain philosophy. This policy did not exclude 
bringing Truth into alignment with speculative hypotheses about the nature of the 
universe.   
 Cartesianism’s lacunae and its substitution of dubious abstract reasoning for 
physico-theological extrapolation produced a bouquet of corrective metaphysics 
which conceded mechanism a partial, but only a partial role in physics and 
physiology. Henry More and Ralph Cudworth were concerned to add on subordinate 
spiritual agents such as hylarchic principles and plastic natures and to insist on divine 
planning, supervision, intervention and even permeation of nature. G.W. Leibniz 
claimed that the metaphysical substratum of corpuscularian physics was vital and 
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mental and that the world was specially selected by God. Their advocacy of the 
corpuscularian hypothesis as the partial though not the exclusive truth enabled these 
speculators and propounders of mere hypotheses to escape the unfortunate branding 
of vain philosophy. They provided assurance of the philosophers’ commitment to 
providential design and final causes—the antithesis of Epicurean chance and vain 
philosophy. As Pierre Gassendi had earlier, Boyle stepped into the role of apologist, 
lacing his physico-chemical treatises with references to God, and treating the 
transcendental subjects not amendable to experiment and conjecture—soul, God, life 
after death, and the origins of the world –as best he could.  He presented a counter 
philosophy—his providential universe. And he elaborated this picture in numerous 
essays—the Free Inquiry, the Usefulness of Theology, and the Christian Virtuoso.   
Like the other revisionists just cited, Newton added even more speculative 
elements, in the form of active powers, to the spare Cartesian system of matter and 
motion in the Queries to his Opticks, ‘Have not,’ he asks, ‘the small Particles of 
Bodies certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces by which they act at a distance… upon one 
another for producing a great part of the Phaenomena of Nature? For it’s well know 
that Bodies act one upon another by the Attractions of Gravity, Magnetism and 
Electricity… and… there may be more attractive Powers than these. For Nature is 
very consonant and conformable to her self.’
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  Speculations of this type were 
permissible because theology and non-material powers were carefully and explicitly 
built into them.  
Newton’s own optical theory of ‘fits’
76
 was intended to be visualized in 
corpuscularian terms, as was his account of the solution of gold and silver in aqua 
regia and aqua fortis, which he discusses in the same terms as the mechanical 
philosophers—probably Hartsoeker and Lemery—whose chemical writings Cotes 
meant to disparage.
77
  But regardless of his favourable attitude towards atomism,
78
 his 
early fascination with and use of Descartes’s Principles, 
79
and his own theological 
unorthodoxy, 
80
 Newton did not want to be identified as a developer of 
Cartesianism.
81
 He was well aware of the Pauline sentiment, which he quotes several 
times, commenting: 
 
By philosophy & vain deceipt after the traditions of men [Paul] understands the 
opinions of old Philosophers handed down by tradition concerning the origin & 
nature of body & spirit, the origin of the world, the origin nature number {sons} 
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power qualities & actions & genealogies of the Gods, the preexistence & 
transmigration of souls & doctrines of Ghosts or Dæmons & all other philosophical 
doctrines or opinions not revealed whether they be false or uncertain. All disputes 
about these matters are in respect of the true religion & the salvation of mankind, 
vane bablings & oppositions of science falsly so called, & therefore are here 




4. Newton and the ‘Confutation of Atheism’ 
Newton’s famous Descartes-condemning General Scholium added to the 
second edition of the Principia, begins with the observation that ‘the hypothesis of 
vortices is beset with many difficulties’.
83
 Newton could see, what initially escaped 
both Leibniz and Huygens for all their mathematical brilliance, that vortices could not 
work for physical reasons. But an equally serious problem with the vortex theory was 
that it depicted a self-sufficient mechanical system; it was the fundamental element of 
Descartes’s overall self-sufficient mechanical system that included soulless animals 
and human survival machines. What might have counted as a defect of Newton’s own 
account—that the cosmos was not self-sustaining and that Mercury and eventually all 
the planets would eventually crash into the sun—was converted into a virtue: proof of 
God’s power and care in not letting this happen. The General Scholium rushed to 
establish in paragraph 3 that ‘this most beautiful System of Sun, Planets, and Comets, 
could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful 
being’ 
84
 Newton assures us that God rules all things ‘not as the world soul, but as the 
lord of all’, that he is ‘Omnipresent, not only virtually, but also substantially.’ When 
he goes on to insist that gravity is not a hypothesis that he has feigned, but a deduction 
from the phenomena, his point is continuous with what went before. Gravity is an 
element of the divinely-fashioned order of a personal God, not, as one might 
otherwise suppose, an alternative that substitutes for it.  Attraction was not, he 
emphasized in his famous letter to Bentley, an intrinsic property of matter,
85
 as the 
Epicureans supposed the weight and motion of atoms to be. ‘The hypothesis of 
deriving the frame of the world by mechanical principles from matter spread evenly 
through the heavens [is] inconsistent with my system.’
86
 
  In the General Scholium, Newton expounded his view of God’s nature and 
presence in the world in a lengthy paragraph. Then, after pronouncing his famous non 




‘…[A]nd now we might add something concerning a certain most subtle Spirit, 
which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies; by the force and action of which 
Spirit, the particles of bodies mutually attract one another at near distances, and 
cohere, if contiguous; and electric bodies operate to greater distances, as well 
repelling as attracting the neighbouring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected, 
refracted, inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is excited, and the 
members of animal bodies move at the command of the will, namely, by the 
vibrations of this Spirit, mutually propagated along the solid filaments of the 





Newton admitted that ‘[W]e [are not] furnish’d with that sufficiency of experiments 
which is required to an accurate determination and demonstration of the laws by 
which this electric and elastic spirit operates.’ The vibrational Spirit was an 
hypothesis, a far wilder, more imaginative, more speculative hypothesis than anything 
propounded by the Cartesians. But, embedded as it is in a proper theological 
discourse, it wasn’t the kind of hypothesis to be found in vain philosophy.  
  The message that physical science leads to an understanding and appreciation  
of God and not away from Him was reinforced in the Queries to the Opticks, where 
Newton cited observational data from the surface of the world. ‘The Uniformity in the 
Bodies of Animals… [a]lso the first Contrivance of those very artificial Parts of 
Animals, the Eyes, Ears, Brain, Muscles… and other Organs of Sense and Motion; 
and the Instinct of Brutes and Insects, can be the effect of nothing else than the 
Wisdom and Skill of a powerful ever-living Agent.’
88
 These additions were successful 
in the eyes of his followers. In his ‘Plan of Education for a young Prince,’ Andrew 
Ramsay recommended Newtonianism with its ‘ethereal fluid that pervades all Things’ 
‘purer than Light itself, …the Body of God,’ that is ‘like the Sensorium of the Deity.’ 
This metaphysics, he said, will elevate the mind and teach it to despise ‘all these 
imaginary, dark, and impious Systems that tend to explain Nature by blind mechanical 




To summarise, while Cartesianism was criticised for presenting imaginary 
micromodels, its models in fact differed from those favoured in mainstream Royal 
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Society experimental philosophy, and in his own epistemological stance towards them 
Descartes was far from being the certitudianarian he purported to be in metaphysics. 
Cartesian ‘speculation’ was less fanciful than Newton’s own, outside of the strictly 
‘mathematical philosophy’ portions of the Principia. But as an accurate appreciation 
of Descartes’s beliefs and intentions took hold in English as well as other European 
circles, and as it became clear in what direction Spinoza had taken the Cartesian 
philosophy, the dissociation of Newtonian physics, methodology and implications 
from that of the Cartesians became a priority. The English responded by asserting a 
commitment to Providential regulation, creationist physico-theology, and spiritual 
principles active in nature, and by treating Newtonianism as a ‘confutation of 
atheism.’ The eight Boyle lectures of 1692 by Bentley,
90
 the sixteen sermons of 
Samuel Clarke in 1704-5
91
 and the ‘Astro-theology’ of William Derham (1714),
92
 fall 
within this category. 
  
5. Rationalism and Empiricism?  
Anstey suggested that the experimental-speculative distinction might have given rise 
to the division between empiricism and rationalism, and in the next-to-final section of 
this paper I want to address that claim.  




 century philosopher self-identifies as 
an empiricist or as a rationalist. Apart from a mention in Bacon, the term ‘empirici’ 
and its cognates appear in only a sprinkling of English writers, none of them 
canonical, before the mid-19
th
 century. Leibniz contrasted his own Platonism with 
Locke’s alleged Aristotelianism, but the term philosophia rationalis referred amongst 
18
th
 century textbook writers to logic and epistemology, not to the polemical stance 
associated by Leibniz with Platonism’s invocation of abstract ideas and incorporeal 
substances. Diderot’s reference to philosophie rationnelle to refer to metaphysics also 
appears to be isolated, though a posthumous work of 1836 by Joseph de Maistre 
employs the term in its title contrastively.
 93 
When the terms are used earlier, the sense 
is not the modern one.
94
 
 These philological points do not affect the claim under discussion, that 
‘empiricism’ in our sense evolved from anti-rationalist, in our sense, experimental 
philosophy. However, that claim is, I believe, defeated by the observation that the so 
called rationalists—Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza cited the results of experiments and 
observations in physiology, optics, natural history, anatomy, microscopy, etc. 
19 
 
frequently as vindicating or illustrating their metaphysical claims. By contrast, Locke 
and Hume, with their preference for naked-eye observation, made no such 
extrapolations. Locke was on the experimental sidelines, even with his medical 
degree, and the superempircist Hume completely outside experimental practice. Both 
empiricists emphasize the limits of experimentally derived knowledge.  
 Nevertheless, there is something profoundly right about the association 
between rationalism and philosophical invention, indeed, between rationalism and the 
fantastic. Instead of reflecting an armchair vs. hands-on orientation, ‘rationalism’ and 
‘empiricism’ can be seen as constituting divergent responses to the anxiety—in the 
natural philosopher’s own case or in that of their readers and observers—over the 
implications of the mechanical-corpuscular philosophy for religion and morality. 
 The rationalist way of responding was to insist that philosophy had a form of 
access to the truth that did not depend on the senses alone but on the grasp of certain 
logical implications and necessary conditions and in doing so to develop new 
conceptions of God, the soul, and the life to come that could frame or be dovetailed 
with the experimental-mechanical philosophy. The imagination was allowed to rove 
freely in constructing these accounts even when they were presented as rigorous 
deductions. The Cartesian Malebranche made all perception and motion take place ‘in 
God;’ Spinoza adopted the framework of Cartesian mechanism but made every finite 
substance a mode of God. Leibniz took over the corpuscularian philosophy but 
designated immortal, incorporeal monads, elements of the best possible world, as its 
true rudiments. Kant proposed a noumenal world where free will and vital principles 
reside and declared God and the soul to be conceptually indispensable ‘ideas.’  
 The way in which those whom we think of as the canonical empiricists dealt 
with the perceived threat to morality and religion was altogether different. It was to 
ban or severely limit discourse about experience-transcendent objects, not only about 
God and the soul, but also about ‘matter.’ We cannot discover how the corpuscular 
constituents of things may be arranged and what they may be doing to produce the 
appearances, or where thinking comes from, or even if it arises from the brain, as 
Locke himself supposed it may well, because all this is beyond the bounds of sense. 
For Hume, we have absolutely no idea what matter or the soul might be, and Kant’s 
critical philosophy denied that we have knowledge and can make ‘determinative 
judgements’ about God, the soul, the ultimate constituents of the universe, and its 
original beginnings. Kant’s so-called reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism, 
20 
 
was a combination of the two strategies of inventiveness and critique that quelled his 




  The third response, adopted by those philosophers who have always resisted 
incorporation into the two pedagogical categories of rationalism and empiricism, was 
to carry on with experiment and speculation as to the powers of matter and to frame 
naturalistic accounts of the origins of morality and political order. Diderot’s rejection 
of philosophie rationelle, the professed admiration of the French Encyclopaedists for 
Bacon and Locke as experimental-experiential philosophers
96
 and Buffon’s anti-
Leibnizianism, were consistent with the development of Cartesian-Newtonian 
hypothetical speculation about invisible mechanisms and active powers.
97
 The 
philosophes advanced hypotheses, rather lightly rooted perhaps, but rooted 
nevertheless, in experiment and observation, on the origins of the world, the 
mechanisms of generation, and the distribution of sensitivity in nature; they are 
proponents of active matter, epigenetics, and transformism. Now, however, these 
speculations were turned against ‘superstition,’ i.e. religion, which, in a reversal of its 
old status as the Truth, exactly as Stillingfleet had commented, was presented ever 
more explicitly as a fiction invented and sustained by the human imagination.  
 
6. Theism and Empiricism 
The English attitude towards imagination, fancy, and speculation in scientific contexts 
may help to explain, finally, an important and curious phenomenon, namely the 
hostile reaction to Darwinism on the publication of the Origin of Species in 1859 and 
the Descent of Man in 1871, by contrast with the more favourable reception in 
Scotland, France and Germany. Darwin was straightaway accused of ‘baseless 
vapourings of scientific credulity.’
98
 As T.H. Huxley described it in his essay on the 
reception of Darwinism, ‘[Y]ears had to pass away before misrepresentation, ridicule, 
and denunciation, ceased to be the most notable constituents of the majority of the 
multitudinous criticisms of his work which poured from the press.’
99
 British naked-
eye empiricism and theology continued their longstanding alliance and made common 
cause here against a purely qualitative theory dependent on a purely conceptual 
analogy between the breeder and Nature. Even in 1871, the reviewer for the Lancet 




Until Mr. Darwin can overcome the strong evidence that undoubtedly exists adverse 
to his views, he cannot hope to carry conviction to the minds of those even disposed 
to accept the bold flights of a speculative mind. To those, on the other hand, who 
would require testimony of the strongest possible kind to substantiate views so 
utterly opposed to their conception of man’s mental and moral attributes, and the 
responsibilities which the possession of them necessarily entails, Mr. Darwin’s array 





Yet outside of England, the natural philosophers of the late 18
th
 and early 19
th
 century 
had embraced, or at least entertained such theses as materialism, transformism, an 
aged earth, and the natural formation of the cosmos. With Kant a notable exception 
after his highly speculative pre-critical period, they had addressed the problem of 
‘originall causes’ with great enthusiasm. The Comte de Buffon—who claimed to be a 
Newtonian remaining on the surface of a veiled nature—was a shining and influential 
example, through his experiments on generation, his theory of organic molecules and 
‘moulds,’ his studies of speciation, and the inferences he drew from geological 
evidence regarding the formation of the earth and the appearance of successive forms 
of life over the eons.  
There are many differences in the Continental and English contexts to explain 
this difference of reception of Darwinian biology in England. One might point to 
clandestine nature of French publishing and distribution in the 18th century, which 
actually encouraged the promulgation of extreme, anonymous views, the clerical 
character and prestige of the English universities, and the post-Revolution association 
between terrorism, socialism and free-thinking, and materialist transmutationism. But 
I suggest that the success of Newton and the Newtonians in ‘disappearing’ the conflict 
between natural philosophy and theology via a combination of empiricistic and even 
phenomenalistic strictures on scientific methodology, and observation-based physico-
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